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Abstract  Abating the threat climate change poses to the lives of future  
people clearly challenges our development models. The 2011 Human Devel- 
opment Report rightly focuses on the integral links between sustainability  
and equity. However, the human development and capabilities approach 
emphasizes the expansion of people’s capabilities simpliciter, which is ques- 
tionable in view of environmental sustainability. We argue that capabilities 
should be defined as triadic relations between an agent, constraints and poss- 
ible functionings. This triadic syntax particularly applies to climate change: 
since people’s lives and capabilities are dependent on the environment, sus- 
tainable human development should also include constraining human activi- 
ties in order to prevent losses in future people’s well-being due to  the  
adverse effects of exacerbated climate change. On this basis, we will advocate 
that the goals of sustainable human development should be informed by a fra- 
mework that consists of enhancing capabilities up to a threshold level, as well 
as constraining the functionings beyond this threshold in terms of their green- 
house gas emissions. 
 
Key words: Sustainable human development, 2011 Human Development 
Report, Capabilities, Climate change 
 
Introduction 
Neumayer notes that the literatures on human development and sustainable 
development have long been separate, which is surprising because ‘on a    
very fundamental level, human development is what sustainability propo- 
nents want to sustain and without sustainability, human development is not 
true human development’ (2010, p. 1). This has changed with the introduc- 
tion  of  the  Human  Development  Reports  (HDRs)  by  the  United Nations 
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Development Programme (UNDP). The concept of ‘sustainable human devel- 
opment’ (SHD) gained real prominence in the 1994 HDR, which argued that 
there is no tension between human development and sustainability, because 
both are essential components of the universality of  life claims, which ‘is   
the common thread that binds the demands of human development  today  
with the exigencies of development tomorrow’ (UNDP, 1994, p. 13). The 
2007/08 HDR argues that climate change affects all people in all countries, 
but the world’s poorest are the most vulnerable to its  harmful  effects  
(UNDP, 2007, p. 21). Together with the history of emissions accumulation  
and distribution, this points to an inverse relationship between climate  
change vulnerability and responsibility (2007, p. 43). The 2010 HDR reiterates 
the centrality of ethical universalism, arguing that SHD is about making sure 
that present as well as future people can lead healthy, educated and fulfilling 
lives: ‘human development, if not sustainable, is not true human develop- 
ment’ (UNDP, 2010, p. 19). The 2011 HDR highlights the integral links 
between the closely related challenges of environmental sustainability and 
equity (UNDP, 2011, p. 13). 
Environmental sustainability relates to ‘the need to operate within the 
ecological carrying capacity of the earth’ (Ross, 2009, p. 38). In order to 
avoid unacceptable environmental change and maintain the biophysical pre- 
conditions for human development, human activities should not transgress 
certain  ‘planetary  boundaries’  (Rockstro¨m  et  al.,  2009,  p.  472).1  Hence, 
environmental sustainability should be at the core of SHD—which is acknowl- 
edged by the 2011 HDR (UNDP, 2011, p. 16). Thus, the social goal of enhan- 
cing people’s capabilities and well-being should be situated within the 
biophysical constraints  of the ecosphere. 
Although it is not the only environmental threat, we focus on climate 
change for two important reasons. First, ‘climate change represents one of  
the most serious and far-reaching challenges facing humankind in the twenty-
first Century’, because the economic, social, human and environ- mental 
costs of inaction are likely to be extremely high (Byers et al., 2005, 
p. 1). Hence, climate change mitigation should be regarded as a central 
concern of SHD.
2 
Keeping the most likely global warming due to greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions to 28C above pre-industrial levels will require us to limit 
cumulative GHG emissions over the entire ‘Anthropocene’ (Allen et al., 2009, 
p. 56). The adverse effects of unmitigated human-induced climate change thus 
clearly illustrate the need for taking the biophysical constraints of the eco- 
sphere seriously—in this case, the maximum permissible budget of total net 
GHG emissions.
3 
Second, GHG emission rates continue to increase with a 
rising Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2011, p. 30). Although the 
resulting environmental cost is mainly attributable to economic growth, it is 
clear that the efforts needed to mitigate climate change challenge our develop- 
ment models. 
We welcome the focus of the 2011 HDR on the links between sustainabil- 
ity and equity. However, the question addressed in this paper is whether the 
account  developed  by  the  2011  HDR—and  more  broadly,  by  the human  
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development and capabilities (HDC) approach
4—meets these requirements 
of environmental sustainability. We will argue that the HDC approach 
cannot adequately scrutinize the share of material progress in its model of 
development, due to some ambiguities in its theoretical underpinnings. Sub- 
sequently, we will argue that capabilities need to be conceptualized as 
triadic relations between an agent, constraints and possible functionings. 
Building on recent debates in the literature, we suggest that this triadic 
syntax demonstrates that there is a strong moral reason to constrain human 
activities in order to prevent losses in future people’s well-being due to the 
aggravated adverse effects of unmitigated climate change. In the fourth 
section we will therefore advocate that the goals of SHD should include the 
expansion of people’s freedoms and capabilities up to a threshold level, as 
well as constraining people’s functioning combinations in terms of their 
GHG emissions. 
 
The 2011 HDR: integral links between equity and sustainability 
The 2011 HDR sets out by stating that the past progress rates of human devel- 
opment might not continue because conditions regarding the two key dimen- 
sions of environmental sustainability and equity have deteriorated (UNDP,  
2011, p. 13). Therefore, the main issues are ‘the adverse repercussions for 
human development of the lack of environmental sustainability.. .and more 
positively, the intersections between greater sustainability and  equity,  as  
well as the potential for progressive reforms that  promote  both  goals’  
(2011, p. 19). Considering equity and sustainability jointly does not mean  
that they are mutually reinforcing in all instances, but compels us to identify 
positive synergies between the two and to give special consideration to the 
trade-offs. 
This account is explicitly based on the universality of life claims: ‘the rec- 
ognition of a shared claim to the basic capability to lead worthwhile lives’ 
(Anand and Sen, 1994, p. 4). While the uncertainty about future people’s capa- 
bilities led earlier positions (for example, Anand and Sen, 1994, pp. 27 – 28; 
UNDP, 1994, p. 18) to assume the feasibility of the substitutability of environ- 
mental by human capital, the 2011 HDR by contrast argues that this uncer- 
tainty requires protecting the availability and diversity of natural resources 
(UNDP, 2011, p. 14). In view of the detrimental impacts of anthropogenic 
climate change, the 2011 HDR forcefully states that ‘the message is clear: 
our development model is bumping up against concrete limits’ (2011, p. 15). 
We endorse the 2011 HDR’s emphasis on the integral links between 
equity and sustainability, as well as its concerns regarding climate change 
within the framework of ethical universalism. Nonetheless, some ambiguities 
remain in its account of SHD. The 2011 HDR criticizes sustainability perspec- 
tives, noting that, in general, they do not adequately capture SHD: ‘they do 
not refer to the expansion of choice, freedoms and capabilities intrinsic to 
human development’ (UNDP, 2011, p. 17). Many of these accounts allegedly 
view  equity  and  the  plight  to  the  poor  as  separate  and  unrelated  issues 
 
61 
 (2011, p. 19). While this critique is to a certain extent valid, the pendulum 
should not swing too far the other way: an  account  of  SHD  must  also 
avoid the risk of overemphasizing human development at the cost of 
sustainability. 
Consider the HDC approach’s treatment of the income dimension. On 
the one hand, it heavily criticizes the opulence-oriented view of development 
for being an insufficient basis for human development: freedom also depends 
on other determinants—such as social arrangements and political and civil lib- 
erties (Sen, 1999, p. 3; UNDP, 2010, p. 40). The HDC approach substantiates 
its model of development accordingly, incorporating health and education 
together with income. Moreover, the 2011 HDR  criticizes  economic  
growth, because income inequality has worsened and  the  environmental  
cost of climate change is positively associated with income growth (UNDP, 
2011, p. 25). These observations are consistent with the substantial argu- 
ments in the literature on the limits to growth (for example, Jackson, 2009; 
Meadows et al., 1972). 
The question as to whether present lifestyles are acceptable was already 
raised in the 1994 HDR, which claims that ‘a major restructuring of the 
world’s income and consumption patterns may be a necessary precondition 
for any viable strategy of sustainable development’  (UNDP,  1994, p. 19).  
The HDR 1998 similarly states that the environmentally damaging consump- 
tion of some harms the well-being of others (UNDP,  1998, p. 47). Indeed,   
the HDR 2011 scrutinizes consumption patterns in the very high HDI 
countries: today’s atmospheric GHG concentrations are largely the accumu- 
lation of developed countries’ past emissions, and people in very high HDI 
countries still account for many times the emissions of people in the least 
developed countries (UNDP, 2011, pp. 32 – 33). 
On the other hand, however, the HDC approach also acknowledges the 
instrumental value of income: income growth can be ‘very important as [a] 
means to expanding the freedoms enjoyed by the members of the society’ 
(Sen, 1999, p. 3; original emphasis). The HDI includes the income dimension 
as a proxy for a decent standard of living, as a surrogate for all human choices 
that are not reflected in the health and education dimensions (UNDP, 2000, 
p. 17). The importance of the income dimension is nuanced in the current 
computation by taking the geometrical average of the HDI’s three dimensions 
to limit substitutability between them, and by using the natural logarithmic 
adjustment of real income per capita in order to reflect the assumption that  
the transformation of income into well-being diminishes with increasing 
income (UNDP, 2010, p. 216). Yet this methodology retains  economic  
growth as a prominent indicator  of a  country’s  development,  even when  
the observed income level rises above what might be called a decent standard 
of living. Indeed, the 2010 HDR admits that ‘countries became top performers 
on the HDI through two broad routes: fast income growth or exceptional pro- 
gress in health and education’ (2010, p. 46). Despite the critical consider- 
ations mentioned above, the development and material wealth  levels  of  
these top performers remain the normative goal of development. ‘Very   High 
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Human Development’ appears to take precedence over its consequences, 
including sustainability (Crabtree, 2013). 
Including economic growth unqualifiedly as an intrinsic part of the devel- 
opment model is morally questionable in view of the requirements of environ- 
mental sustainability. Given the biophysical constraints of the ecosphere, the 
development model and GHG emission levels of the very high HDI countries 
cannot be transferred to the rest of the world (Sachs and Santarius, 2007, 
p. 151). Nonetheless, developing countries’ development is structured to 
follow their unsustainable path: emissions in the developing countries have 
doubled in the last two decades, accounting for most of the global emissions 
growth (Peters et al., 2011, p. 8903). Climate change thus challenges the defi- 
nition of human development as the expansion of people’s substantive free- 
doms, when the latter are conceptualized simpliciter and presuppose the 
possibility of infinite material progress. 
The 2011 HDR distinguishes between three categories of environmental 
risk factors (UNDP, 2011, p. 27). First, risks with an immediate impact on 
households (e.g. poor water quality and sanitation) decline as the HDI rises. 
Second, risks with community effects (e.g. urban air pollution) follow the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve: they first worsen as the HDI rises and later 
improve. Finally, and in contrast, environmental risk factors with global 
effects (e.g. GHG emissions) continue to increase with a rising HDI. Hence, 
in the case of climate change, calling for more human development in the 
form of the expansion of freedoms simpliciter is insufficient to abate the 
threat. Nonetheless, Anand and Sen insist that human development is not  
only intrinsically important in enhancing current people’s capabilities, but  
also instrumentally important ‘in increasing their “human capital” with  
lasting influence in the future’ (1994, pp. 32 – 33). Hence, they consider 
human development to be a major contribution to sustainability. Essentially 
following this reasoning, the 2011 HDR, for example, supports community 
management of environmental resources as an alternative to centralized 
control (UNDP, 2011, p. 75). Although such initiatives represent needed 
synergies  between equity and sustainability,  in view of the  adverse effects  
of global environmental threats—such as climate change—on the living con- 
ditions of especially future people (see the third section below), there is also a 
strong moral reason to constrain the appropriative material demands on the 
global environment, especially by the worldwide consumption elites (Sachs 
and Santarius, 2007, p. 153). However, the 2011 HDR still does not include 
environmental sustainability in the calculations of the HDI,
5 
although the  
HDI is exactly the headline indicator: ‘the figure that impacts most on those 
that read each HDR, and especially so given the presentation  of the results   
as a league table of attainment’ (Morse, 2003, p. 192). ‘Greening’ the HDI 
would provide a more nuanced account of human development and have a 
greater impact on development policies (see, for example, Morse, 2003; Neu- 
mayer, 2010). 
The 2011 HDR defines SHD as ‘the expansion of the substantive freedoms 
of   people   today   while   making   reasonable   efforts   to   avoid  seriously 
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compromising those of future generations’ (UNDP, 2011, p. 18). This defi- 
nition is normative: only the sustainability of states of events that expand sub- 
stantive freedoms is sought for. For example, regarding energy policy, the 
2011 HDR argues that ‘equitable and sustainable development requires 
making energy available for all, controlling emissions and shifting to new  
and cleaner energy sources’ (2011, p. 67). As much as this is true, problems 
arise when the 2011 HDR focuses on ‘greening’ the production of energy  
and devalues measures to reduce energy consumption (e.g. price incentives; 
2011, pp. 67 – 70, see especially table 4.1). Hence, it clearly favours efficiency 
measures at the production side because they do not conflict with the expan- 
sion of freedoms, while reducing energy consumption potentially restricts 
individual freedoms. 
However, a sensible strategy to tackle climate change must address both 
aspects. A one-sided focus on production efficiency is flawed, because decou- 
pling—lowering the carbon intensity of production—is a vital, but far from 
convincing, strategy to achieve sustainability: improvements in production 
efficiency have been negated by total consumption growth, resulting in a con- 
tinued increase of GHG emissions (Jackson, 2009, p. 67; Mont and Plepys, 
2008, p. 531; Ross, 2009, pp. 35 and 51). Moreover,  there is a growth in  
GHG emission transfers via international trade, which partially explains the 
stabilization of emission rates in the developed countries and the steep 
increase in developing countries (Peters et al., 2011, p. 8903). Reducing pat- 
terns and levels of material consumption in the developed countries is a vital 
strategy for attaining sustainability, but the clash between these distributional 
issues and consumer sovereignty principles (Mont and Plepys, 2008, p. 531; 
UNDP, 1998, p. 86) explains the reluctance of the HDC approach to 
thoroughly  scrutinize  luxury consumption. 
In our view, these ambiguities are a logical consequence of a theoretical 
framework that identifies human development with the expansion of people’s 
freedoms simpliciter. According to Sen, human development reasoning and 
the social choice theory at its basis are ‘firmly tied to asking “comparative” 
questions: how can we advance justice or reduce injustice in the world?’ 
(2008, p. 337). In contrast with Rawls’s transcendental approach—which 
focuses on the identification of fully just institutions—Sen argues that we 
should   concentrate   on   ranking   alternative   social   arrangements   (2006, 
p. 216; 2009, pp. 101 – 102). Advancing justice or reducing manifest injustices 
in a society, ‘demands comparative judgments about justice, for which the 
identification of fully just social arrangements is neither necessary nor suffi- 
cient’ (2006, p. 217). Although we are sympathetic to Sen’s concerns, this 
approach at least gives the impression that the expansion of freedoms—sim- 
pliciter—could proceed ad libitum (Crabtree, 2010, p. 163) and lacks an 
account of justifiable restrictions on freedom (see below). Indeed, the 1990 
HDR argues that human development is a process of enlarging people’s 
choices that in principle ‘can be infinite and change  over  time’  (UNDP, 
1990, p. 10, box 1.1; emphasis added). This conception is particularly ques- 
tionable in view of the risk that freedoms are used for unsustainable actions 
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 (Rauschmayer et al., 2011, p. 13). Indeed, ‘some freedoms and lifestyles (not 
least those reliant on carbon based growth) that many people may value .. . 
can have detrimental consequences for present and coming generations’ 
(Crabtree, 2010, p.  163). 
This is not to say that the HDC approach underestimates the challenges 
that climate change poses to our development models or depreciates the 
requirements of sustainability. Our claim here is that  these  challenges  
should figure more explicitly: the HDC approach would benefit from unam- 
biguously rejecting the view of capabilities as ‘a set of disembodied freedoms’ 
(Jackson, 2009, p. 45). To be clear, we do not wish to deny people the right to 
a decent standard of living; SHD can ignore neither the inequitable depri- 
vation in the developing countries, nor  the  unsustainable  consumption  
levels in the developed countries. We do not reject the moral imperative of 
expanding human freedoms, but SHD should explicitly acknowledge the bio- 
physical constraints of the ecosphere. That is, a high quality of life ought to be 
ensured while sustaining the carrying capacity of the ecosphere through 
respecting its biophysical  constraints. 
In the following section, we will therefore draw on the existing literature 
to advocate viewing capabilities within a triadic syntax, for this not only draws 
attention to the expansion of people’s capabilities, but also to the necessity of 
constraining human activities in order to prevent people’s actions from 
causing illegitimate harm to others. The triadic syntax particularly applies     
to climate change: since people’s lives and capabilities are dependent on     
the environment, SHD should include constraining human  activities  in  
order to prevent losses in future people’s well-being due to the aggravated 
adverse effects of exacerbated climate change. On this basis, the fourth 
section of this paper will sketch a framework that consists in enhancing capa- 
bilities up to a threshold level, while constraining the functionings beyond 
this threshold. 
 
 
Capabilities and environmental dependency 
Capabilities as triadic relations 
MacCallum rejects the canonical distinction between negative and positive 
freedom—most vividly described by Berlin (1969, pp. 121 – 122)—in favour 
of a triadic conceptualization: 
 
Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is 
always freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference 
with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming 
something. Such freedom is thus always of something (an agent or 
agents), from something, to do, not do, become, or not become 
something; it is a triadic relation. (MacCallum, 1967, p. 314; original 
emphasis, footnote omitted) 
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Arguably, this triadic syntax is implicitly acknowledged by the HDC 
approach. For example, even though Sen has primarily focused on capability 
sets—which has ‘the effect of taking note of the positive freedoms in a general 
sense (the freedom “to do this,” or “to be that”) that a person has’ (1985, 
p. 201)—he also recognizes both the instrumental and intrinsic importance    
of negative freedoms (1985, p. 219; 1988, p. 275). Hence, capabilities can    
be understood as an agent x, who is free from constraint y to achieve function- 
ing z. 
The HDC approach clearly illustrates that constraints to freedom can 
arise from numerous sources (such as disability, illness,  social  conditions 
and institutional arrangements), but the notion of  freedom  particularly  
draws attention to cases where the presence of an obstacle can be attributed  
to the action of another human being (Miller, 1983, p. 68). Indeed, people’s 
choices are deeply interconnected and can have important  consequences  
upon other people’s lives, including the barriers x2’s actions can impose to  
the capabilities of x1, and which may lead to losses in the well-being of x1 
(Deneulin, 2002, p. 507). 
Hence, considering capabilities within the triadic syntax not only brings 
the freedom from constraints to the foreground, but also includes the neces- 
sity of constraining people’s freedom in order to prevent illegitimate interfer- 
ence that reduces another person’s well-being. Deneulin argues that a 
capability theorist who emphasizes the crucial role of freedom as a com- 
ponent of human well-being should recognize policy interventions that 
restrain individual freedoms for the greatest well-being of all (2002, p. 507). 
In the liberal political tradition, such form of paternalistic intervention can   
be justified with reference to Mill’s harm principle (Deneulin, 2002, p. 510; 
Nussbaum, 2000, p. 53)—that is, ‘the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others’ (Mill, 2008, p.  14). 
In sum, whereas the HDC approach can lead to conceptualizing human 
development as expanding freedoms infinitely, viewing  capabilities within 
the triadic syntax entails that the imperative of enhancing people’s capabili- 
ties also includes policy interventions that impose certain constraints,  in 
order to prevent their actions from causing harm to others and, thus, consists 
in carefully balancing freedoms and constraints. In the following subsection, 
this triadic syntax will be applied to the issue of climate change and our com- 
mitments  to  future people. 
 
Environmental dependency and commitments towards future people 
The HDC approach recognizes that the quality of the natural environment and 
the health of ecosystems are crucial for allowing people to lead the lives that 
they value (Sen, 2010, p. 130; 2013; Nussbaum, 2011, p. 163; UNDP, 2011, 
p. 14; Hirvilammi et al., 2013). To take account of this instrumental value of 
nature to human life, Holland has proposed to add ‘“Sustainable Ecological 
Capacity”  as  a  meta-capability’,  which  involves  the  ability  to  live  in the 
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context of ecological conditions that can provide environmental assets that 
enable people’s capabilities, now and in the future (2008a, p. 324). On this 
basis, she develops an environmental justice threshold—in addition to Nuss- 
baum’s threshold of social justice (see below)—which represents a level at 
which ecological systems have the capacity that enables them to provide     
the assets necessary to reach the threshold of social justice (2008a, p. 328).  
As long as ecosystems have this capacity, the ecological  conditions  of  
justice are met. 
Since people’s capabilities and well-being are dependent on the environ- 
ment, climate change clearly violates the universality of life claims to the capa- 
bilities necessary to live a worthwhile life. Obviously, the freedom from the 
adverse effects caused by exacerbated anthropogenic climate change is 
central to reaching the environmental justice threshold.
6 
Indeed, unmitigated 
climate change is projected to result in inter alia increasing the return period 
and severity of extreme climate events (such as floods, droughts, and heat 
waves), reduced water and food security, increased health risks, ecosystem 
degradation and mass migration (Costello et al., 2009, pp. 1698 – 1699; 
UNDP, 2007, pp. 27 and 30). These adverse effects are likely to prevent 
future people from achieving the environmental  justice threshold  and thus,  
to threaten their lives and capabilities (including health, shelter and 
nourishment). 
Expressed in the triadic syntax, the universality of life claims at least 
requires that future people (x) are free from constraints imposed by the 
adverse effects of exacerbated anthropogenic climate change (y) to be able   
to live a worthwhile life (z). Although the identities of future individuals are 
not yet determined and thus not knowable, as humans they will all be entitled 
to human rights and capabilities (Shue, 2011, p. 293). Due to exacerbated 
climate change, they will be even less able to reach the  environmental  
justice threshold, which is preconditional for social justice. Byers  et  al. 
argue that ‘preventing dangerous climate change, therefore, must be seen      
as a precondition for prosperity and a public good’ (2005, p.   1). 
Sen generally acknowledges that capabilities entail responsibilities and 
duties of others (2009, p. 372) and the 2010 HDR  recognizes  that  the  
reality of climate change requires a fundamental reshaping of people’s 
behaviours and aspirations. However, the 2010 HDR (UNDP, 2010, p. 21)  
and Nussbaum (2011, pp. 163 – 164) admit that the issue  of our commit- 
ment towards future people remains  a  challenge  that  has  yet  to  be  
tackled by the HDC approach. Although the HDC approach has highlighted 
the interactions between social and economic development, intertemporal 
justice and environmental concerns have often been left out of its scope 
(Leßmann and Rauschmayer, 2013). Indeed, the assumption of sustainabil-  
ity that ‘the current generation might have to restrict itself in some ways   
(e.g. restrict its consumption) in order to ensure the preservation of the 
opportunity for a full life for future generations’ has not yet been given pro- 
found  theoretical  consideration  in  the  HDC  approach  (Leßmann,  2011,  
p. 50). 
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Consistent with environmental sustainability, SHD thus also includes the 
necessity of constraining human activities in order to prevent illegitimate 
harms and losses in future people’s well-being due to exacerbated climate 
change. Therefore, in the following section, we will advocate that the goals   
of SHD should be constructed in accordance with a framework consisting     
of capability thresholds and functioning  constraints. 
 
Thresholds and constraints in view of sustainability 
As argued earlier, the comparative approach of Sen and the human develop- 
ment paradigm might lead to identifying human development with expanding 
people’s freedoms unrestrictedly, which is problematic in view of environ- 
mental sustainability. Yet, the goals of SHD should be constructed both in 
accordance with an idea of what social justice consists of and the require- 
ments of environmental sustainability in view of intertemporal  justice. 
 
Capability thresholds 
Based on the Aristotelian idea of truly human functioning and informed by the 
idea of a life with human dignity, Nussbaum has introduced the idea of a 
threshold level of each capability ‘beneath which it is held that truly human 
functioning is not available to citizens; the social goal should be understood  
in terms of getting citizens above this capability threshold’ (2006, p. 71). 
This minimum account of social justice goes beyond Sen’s 
 
merely comparative use of the capability space to articulate an 
account of how capabilities, together with the idea of a threshold 
level of capabilities, can provide a basis for central constitutional 
principles that citizens have a right to demand from their govern- 
ments. (Nussbaum, 2000, p.  12) 
 
Although it is an incomplete account of justice (see below), Nussbaum’s 
approach offers a more tangible basis than the comparative approach for     
the construction of the social goals that should figure in SHD: ‘the structure  
of social and political institutions should be chosen, at least in part, with a 
view to promoting at least a threshold level of these human capabilities’ (Nuss- 
baum, 2000, p. 75). Nussbaum distinguishes between capabilities closely 
related with the idea of human dignity, and instrumental capabilities (2006, 
pp. 292 – 293). While human dignity requires the equal protection of dignity-
securing capabilities (such as political and religious freedoms) for everyone, 
in the case of instrumental capabilities (e.g. shelter and nutrition), in contrast, 
‘what seems appropriate is enough’ (2006, p. 293; original emphasis). 
Although we would rather make the differentiation within capa- bilities—that 
is, each capability requires that the corresponding social as   well as material 
conditions are satisfied—we agree that in order for people    to reach a 
capability threshold, social conditions should be secured equally, 
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while material conditions should be provided sufficiently (see also Peeters, 
2010; 2011, pp. 18 – 19). 
GHG emissions obviously fall on the side of material conditions; hence, it 
seems that they should be distributed sufficiently in order to guarantee the 
capability thresholds. In this regard, Shue has argued that a moral differen- 
tiation should be made between subsistence (or survival) and luxury emis- 
sions (1993, p. 56). This account has been developed further by 
Vanderheiden, whose modified equal shares model  starts  from  the  claim 
that ‘all persons are entitled as a matter of basic rights to survival emissions, 
or a level of emissions sufficient to allow for their basic human functioning’ 
(2008, p. 243). 
However, Gardiner rightly claims that if some emissions are deemed 
morally essential, then they may have to be guaranteed even if this leads to  
an overall allocation above the scientific optimum (2004, p. 585). Moreover, 
determining what counts as guaranteed  minimum  emission  entitlements  
(or, in our  view,  the threshold levels of capabilities) is a difficult matter, 
both in theory and in practice (2004, p. 585). This also seems procedurally 
odd, for proposals for an unequal—sufficientarian—distribution of emission 
entitlements appear ‘to envisage that the climate change problem can be 
resolved by appealing to some notion of social necessity that is independent 
of, and not open to, moral assessment’ (2004, p. 586). Furthermore, both the 
’subsistence emissions’ proposal and the idea of capability thresholds carry 
the political risk that there is nothing to stop some people claiming that 
almost any emission is essential to their way of life. Finally, it is hard to see 
how any agreement could be reached on minimum emission entitlements   
that does anything less than exhaust the maximum permissible on climatolo- 
gical or intertemporal  grounds. 
The account of minimal social justice that takes capability thresholds as 
its point of departure addresses these problems somewhat better. First, it is 
important to note that GHG emissions merely represent the means in pursu- 
ing the goals that people value: ‘carbon emissions should not be the object of a 
human right because a decent human life does not inherently depend on 
them’ (Hayward, 2007, p. 440). Rather than emphasizing the right to a 
certain amount of emissions, each person is entitled to the capabilities up 
to a certain threshold level, which does not hold that they are entitled to 
the supply of a specific amount of particular resources. Moreover, the equal 
per-capita proposal to distribute emission entitlements fails to take account 
of the fact that emissions may play very different roles in people’s lives 
(Gardiner, 2004, p. 584). Since the conversion of resources into the ability 
to promote particular ends may vary from person to person, equality in the 
holdings of resources can lead to serious inequalities in actual freedoms 
(Sen, 1990, p. 115). The idea of capability thresholds emphasizes that material 
conditions should be provided sufficiently in order to enable people to lead a 
worthwhile life, and thus takes these interpersonal variations into account. 
Second, obviously much depends on how the capability thresholds are 
defined. Nussbaum contends that the precise determination of the thresholds 
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is a matter for democratic debate in each nation, but that we should avoid spe- 
cifying unrealistically high thresholds as well as setting the thresholds lower 
than human dignity seems to require (2006, p. 402; 2011,  pp.  41 – 42). 
These debates should be inextricably connected to the fundamental moral 
questions climate change poses concerning how we ought to  live,  what  
kinds of societies we want, and how we should relate to the natural environ- 
ment (Jamieson, 1992, p. 147). Hence, the notion of social necessity inherent 
in the idea of capability thresholds—and people’s claims to emissions—must 
be critically assessed in view of the scarcity of permissible GHG emissions. In 
our view, these suggestions must guide the determination process of the 
precise thresholds, which admittedly remains an issue that requires much 
deeper  consideration. 
Third, the idea of ‘subsistence emissions’ relates to the historical speci- 
ficity of political and economic conditions: the lack of affordable and sustain- 
able alternative energy still renders many, or even most, people dependent on 
fossil fuels for their subsistence (Hayward, 2007, pp. 440 – 441; Shue,  2011, 
p. 307). However, as noted above, the focus on capability thresholds shows 
the merely instrumental value of GHG emissions. As long as people are 
locked in a situation of carbon dependency, they should be allowed to emit 
the GHGs necessary to reach the threshold level. Obviously, however, the 
requirements of environmental sustainability call for the urgent development 
and supply of affordable alternative technologies, which enable people to 
reach the threshold level with significantly less GHG emissions. Shifting the 
focus to capability thresholds thus acknowledges the fact that people have 
differential access to energy sources. In sum, individuals have valid claims   
to emit the GHGs that are necessary for reaching the capability thresholds, 
therefore the collective goal of SHD should be to secure the capability 
thresholds for every person in an ecologically optimal way, appropriating as 
little as possible of the total permissible GHG  budget. 
 
Functioning constraints 
Nonetheless, the threshold framework does not deliver a complete account of 
justice, since it says nothing about capabilities and functionings above the 
thresholds (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 75). Opportunities are likely to result in cor- 
responding functionings beyond the threshold, and these might be unsustain- 
able. However, people are able to control (to some extent, at least) their 
emissions (Vanderheiden, 2008, p. 178)—in particular, those that are not 
necessary for reaching the threshold—and the lifestyles of  individuals  
clearly matter in the realization of sustainability (Spillemaekers et al., 2011, 
p. 79). 
Since Nussbaum’s account does not specify a way to regulate people’s 
activities beyond the threshold, another mechanism should be applied  in 
order to address this individual responsibility for climate change mitigation. 
That is, SHD should also include policy interventions that constrain people’s 
activities beyond the threshold in terms of their fair share of the maximum 
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permissible GHG budget in order to prevent losses in future people’s well- 
being due to exacerbated climate  change. 
Therefore, consistent with the HDC approach’s emphasis on capabilities, 
some have proposed to constrain people’s capabilities as a strategy for achiev- 
ing sustainability. For example, Jackson argues that the concept of capabilities 
should be carefully interpreted ‘as a range of “bounded capabilities” to live 
well—within certain clearly defined limits’ (2009, p. 45). More elaborately, 
Holland has proposed the idea of capability ceilings that establish maximum 
levels of capability protection (2008b, p. 416). The purpose of capability ceil- 
ings, she asserts, is ‘to limit the amount of resources that can be put to protect- 
ing capabilities that are in conflict with each other’ (2008b, p. 416). 
While our view is clearly informed by these proposals to restrict freedom, 
we would advocate that the focus be shifted to functioning constraints, 
because putting ceilings on capability protection seems counter-intuitive in 
light of what a capability represents, namely: ‘the substantive freedom to 
achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the 
freedom to achieve various lifestyles)’ (Sen, 1999, p. 75). Moreover, Nussbaum 
argues that the threshold of each capability should be set in view of the other 
capabilities (2006, p. 402), thus implying that settling conflicts in the protec- 
tion of different capabilities is an essential part of the determination of the 
thresholds. Furthermore, since the thresholds require that material conditions 
be provided merely sufficiently, the amount of resources that is allocated to 
capability protection is already limited to what is deemed appropriate or suffi- 
cient for a life with human dignity. Beyond the threshold, however, it is not 
merely having a capability but the functionings derived from it that potentially 
causes harm, through the impact these functionings have on the natural 
environment (Peeters, 2010, 2011; Schultz et al., 2013). Therefore, it seems 
more accurate to reformulate capability ceilings in terms of functioning con- 
straints that restrain people from functioning in a way that would impose ille- 
gitimate barriers to other people’s lives and capabilities. This reformulation 
makes the discrepancy between people’s  entitlements  to  capabilities  and 
the necessity of preventing them from illegitimately and harmfully interfering 
with other people’s lives theoretically transparent. Moreover, this focus on 
functionings can take account of the total lifecycle of resource use needed   
for realizing well-being (Schultz et al., 2013). 
A policy that implements functioning constraints admittedly reduces the 
freedom of choice and, hence, restricts the capability space as well. That is, 
‘some functionings may even be forestalled completely, particularly where 
they rely heavily on material throughput’ (Jackson, 2009, p. 47), which evi- 
dently also excludes the capabilities to achieve those functionings from 
people’s capability set. Yet, in the case of other functionings, the material 
throughput may be less heavy and, to the extent that GHG emitting activities 
are ubiquitous in people’s lives, it is hard to focus on specific activities. In our 
view, it seems appropriate to constrain an individual’s aggregate net appro- 
priation of the maximum permissible GHG budget. Although it reduces the 
freedom of choice as well, constraining people’s functioning combinations 
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as a whole notably respects agency freedom. That is, people retain the 
freedom as well as the responsibility of managing their limited environmental 
resource budget according to their priorities and  their particular conception  
of the good life. Within the confines of a limited GHG emissions budget, a 
person might, for example, decide to no longer undertake  city  trips  by  
plane in order to eat some meat—although  the  climatic  equivalence  of  
these activities must clearly be decided on the basis of a scientific account. 
Moreover, it is clear that, for example, energy-consuming activities beyond 
the threshold might be more permissible the more they are powered by non-
fossil energy. 
In our view, distributing the GHG emissions budget that remains after 
securing the threshold on an equal per-capita basis seems to be the most 
obvious and equitable solution. As mentioned  above,  it  may be  objected 
that an egalitarian distribution does not take account of the interpersonal vari- 
ations that govern the conversion of resources into ends. However, the pro- 
vision of sufficient  material conditions  so as  to enable everyone to reach  
the capability thresholds partly accommodates for interpersonal variations. 
Moreover, it might be questioned whether justice requires taking the interper- 
sonal variations into account even beyond the threshold—concerning the 
attainment of  luxury. 
A policy that implements functioning constraints seems appealing 
because it focuses on the demand side and, hence, would reduce total con- 
sumption—which is the most important strategy for achieving sustainability 
(see above). It can also be instrumental in attaining consumption efficiency 
(lowering the carbon intensity of products) since, under such a policy, produ- 
cers would have to ‘green’ their production processes in order to remain com- 
petitive. Both strategies are vital to mitigate climate change and thus for 
protecting future people. Unfortunately, sustainability strategies are often 
(perceived as) an obstacle to freedom (Rauschmayer et al., 2011, p. 13). Func- 
tioning constraints indeed at first appear to contradict the moral imperative of 
expanding people’s freedoms. However, constraining people’s materialist 
consumption beyond what is necessary for reaching the capability thresholds 
is likely to improve their capabilities; for example, through enhancing their 
freedom from the barriers imposed by the damaging social logic of material- 
ism and consumerism (such as consumer anxiety, work stress and lack of 
time) as well as the freedom to enjoy other activities, including cultural and 
political participation and social well-being (Jackson, 2009, pp. 100 – 102; Spil- 
lemaekers et al., 2011, p. 77). Since the HDC approach recognizes these com- 
ponents as essential to people’s quality of life, a sustainability strategy 
involving functioning constraints would not be inconsistent with the focus   
on expanding people’s freedoms, that is, if the concept is   qualified. 
 
Conclusion 
We endorse the 2011 HDR’s focus on the integral links between equity and 
sustainability, which is explicitly based on the universality of life claims. 
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These elements are essential for a convincing account of SHD, but the 2011 
HDR somewhat overemphasizes human development at the cost of sustain- 
ability. Even though it criticizes the paradigm that identifies development  
with economic growth for being neither sustainable nor equitable, income 
remains a prominent dimension of development in the 2011 HDR, even 
beyond what might be called a decent standard of living. However, since 
rising GHG emission rates are associated with material progress, climate 
change challenges the definition of human development as the expansion      
of people’s freedoms simpliciter. SHD cannot ignore the unsustainability of 
the material wealth  of the global consumption  elites, certainly not when  it  
is elevated to a key part of the development   goal. 
We have argued that the HDC approach would benefit from unambigu- 
ously incorporating the interconnectedness of people and human depen- 
dence on the natural environment: whereas the HDC approach might be 
susceptible of endorsing the expansion of freedoms ad libitum, the 
account we advocate envisages a more modest development path. Our propo- 
sal starts from the view of capabilities as triadic relations between an agent, 
constraints, and possible functionings. This view suggests that the goal of 
development includes enhancing people’s capabilities up to the threshold 
level as well as functioning constraints preventing people from imposing ille- 
gitimate and harmful barriers to other people’s lives. 
Since people’s capabilities and well-being are dependent on the environ- 
ment, unmitigated climate change clearly violates intertemporal justice. 
Expressed in the triadic syntax, the universality of life claims at least requires 
ensuring that future people are free from constraints imposed by the adverse 
effects of unmitigated anthropogenic climate change to enable them to live a 
worthwhile life. This entails a strong moral reason for not transgressing the 
biophysical constraints  of the ecosphere. 
On this basis, we have argued that the goals of SHD should be con- 
structed in accordance with a framework consisting of capability thresholds 
and functioning constraints. As regards social justice, the goal of SHD  
should be to secure the capability thresholds for every person in an ecologi- 
cally optimal way, emitting as little GHGs as possible. Moreover, building 
upon the existing literature about capability ceilings, environmental sustain- 
ability compels us to constrain people’s functionings beyond the threshold,   
in terms of their total net GHG  emissions. 
In sum, we have proposed to interpret the goals of SHD more modestly 
than the expansion of freedoms ad libitum, especially concerning material 
freedoms: when material conditions are secured sufficiently, the focus of  
SHD should shift to expanding people’s social freedoms as well as situating 
well-being within the biophysical constraints of the   ecosphere. 
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Notes 
1 Environmental sustainability is informed by a scientific account regarding the identification 
and quantification of the biophysical constraints of the ecosphere (Ross, 2009, p. 45). Admit- 
tedly, these issues are still subjects of scientific debate, and might ultimately depend on pol- 
itical agreement. Yet it should be emphasized that there is a substantial body of scientific 
evidence and a broad consensus regarding the existence of the biophysical constraints of  
the  ecosphere 
2 Humanity has by now committed itself to a rise in global temperatures of at least 0.768C, and 
substantial human costs can already be attributed to the resulting climate change (Costello  
et al., 2009, pp. 1698 and 1700 – 1701). Moreover, the climate will continue to change for the 
foreseeable future due to the accumulated GHGs and the inertia of the climate system, as a 
result of which the effect of even the most stringent emissions reduction will take several 
decades  to  become  apparent  as  well  (Fu¨ssel,  2007,  p.  266).  Hence,  an  equitable  climate 
regime should also comprise adaptation and compensation measures. Nonetheless,  our 
focus in this paper is only on the relevance of mitigation to SHD, since it is vital in order 
not to exacerbate the adverse effects climate change will have on future people and to 
reduce the root cause of the problem (see also the section ‘Environmental dependency and 
commitments’ and Fu¨ssel, 2007, p. 265). 
3 The climate change mitigation agenda merely focuses on one aspect of the Earth’s ecosys- 
tem—the effect of increased GHG emissions on the climate—and this may not reflect 
environmental  sustainability  in  relation  to  other  aspects  of  the  ecosphere  (Ross, 2009, 
p. 44). Together with issues of justice towards the environment (as addressed, for 
example, in biocentrist and ecocentric theories), these aspects fall beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
4 Although their development has diverged somewhat throughout the years, the capability 
approach has provided the theoretical foundations of the human development paradigm 
(Robeyns, 2005, p. 94). For clarity, we use one denominator to capture their commonalities. 
5 The 2011 HDR provides data on a range of indicators of environmental sustainability (e.g. 
ecological footprint, carbon dioxide emissions and biodiversity), but does not change the 
HDI computation, so as to keep it as focused as possible (Morse, 2003, p. 192; UNDP,  
1994, p. 91). 
6 Since humanity has already committed itself to substantial global warming, it would be 
utopian to claim that future people can possibly be free from the adverse impacts of anthro- 
pogenic climate change. Nonetheless, it is clear that future people should at least be free 
from the adverse effects of exacerbated climate change  (exacerbated  or  unmitigated 
being key here; see also note  2). 
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